Beyond Apollo: Competing Visions of the United States and China for Lunar Dominance
Introduction
The return to the Moon has emerged as one of the defining scientific and geopolitical projects of the twenty-first century. Between 1969 and 1972, the United States conducted six successful Apollo lunar landings, achieving a feat unmatched for half a century. In recent years, however, both the United States and the People’s Republic of China have embarked on ambitious lunar programs that reflect not only technological aspirations but also broader strategic visions. This article examines the current lunar projects of the United States and China, evaluates their probabilities of success, considers their results, and assesses the broader consequences for international relations, science, economics, and governance. The central argument is that while the United States maintains a technological and alliance-based lead, China’s rapidly advancing program presents a formidable challenge. The outcome will shape the contours of space governance, global power projection, and humanity’s long-term presence beyond Earth.
Theoretical Framework: Space Race and International Relations
The lunar competition can be analyzed through the lenses of international relations theories. Realism highlights the strategic competition between great powers, where lunar exploration becomes an extension of terrestrial rivalry for prestige and security. Liberal institutionalism underscores the potential for cooperation through frameworks such as the Artemis Accords or future multilateral regimes that govern resource exploitation. Constructivism, meanwhile, stresses the symbolic dimension: the narratives of technological prowess, national pride, and civilizational advancement that both the United States and China project through their lunar ambitions.
The historical analogy with the U.S.–Soviet “space race” of the 1960s provides a backdrop, but today’s environment differs markedly. Unlike the Cold War era, where two superpowers dominated, today’s landscape includes multiple state and commercial actors. The Moon is not just a prestige target but a resource-rich environment where water ice, helium-3, and rare earth minerals could underpin future space economies.
Literature Review
Recent scholarship provides insights into the resurgence of lunar exploration. Scholars such as Johnson-Freese (2020) argue that lunar competition is driven as much by geopolitics as by science, with space power serving as a proxy for terrestrial influence. Pelton (2021) emphasizes the growing role of private industry in the U.S. model, contrasting it with China’s state-led approach. Articles in Space Policy and Acta Astronautica highlight the normative challenges of resource governance, particularly regarding the Outer Space Treaty (OST, 1967) and the Artemis Accords (Williams, 2022). Others warn of potential militarization of the Moon (Goswami, 2021), while more optimistic perspectives view lunar bases as platforms for cooperative science and eventual Mars missions (Crawford, 2022).
This body of literature indicates that lunar exploration cannot be divorced from broader political, economic, and ethical considerations. It also reflects the tension between competition and cooperation, as states pursue both prestige and practical goals.
Comparative Analysis: United States vs. China
United States
The United States, through NASA’s Artemis program, has articulated a vision of returning astronauts to the lunar surface and establishing a sustainable presence. Artemis II, scheduled for 2026, will be the first crewed mission to orbit the Moon since Apollo 17. Artemis III, projected for 2027 or later, aims to land astronauts at the lunar south pole, a region of high scientific and resource interest (El País, 2025). Complementing Artemis, NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) contracts companies such as Intuitive Machines, Astrobotic, and Firefly Aerospace to deliver instruments and rovers, fostering a public–private ecosystem (NASA, 2025). Scientific projects such as the Lunar Surface Electromagnetics Experiment (LuSEE Night) and the proposed Laser Interferometer Lunar Antenna (LILA) illustrate the program’s dual focus on exploration and frontier science.
The U.S. also leverages its alliances. The Artemis Accords, signed by more than 30 countries, aim to establish norms for responsible exploration, including transparency, interoperability, and resource utilization (NASA, 2024). This coalition-building enhances legitimacy while consolidating U.S. leadership.
China
China, under the China National Space Administration (CNSA) and the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), has developed a systematic program progressing from robotic to human missions. The Chang’e series has achieved major milestones: Chang’e-5 returned lunar samples in 2020, while Chang’e-6 in 2024 retrieved material from the Moon’s far side (Gov.cn, 2023). Future missions include Chang’e-7 (2026) to the lunar south pole and Chang’e-8 (2028), which will test in-situ resource utilization technologies. China’s human lunar landing is officially targeted for 2030, with the development of the Long March-10 heavy-lift rocket, the Mengzhou crew vehicle, the Lanyue lunar lander, and new extravehicular suits.
In parallel, China is promoting the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), envisioned as a permanent base at the lunar south pole by 2035, developed in cooperation with Russia and other partners (CGTN, 2024). Unlike the U.S., which emphasizes commercial collaboration, China’s approach is state-directed, with tight integration between space ambitions and national strategy.
Other Actors
While the focus is on the United States and China, other actors play critical roles. India’s Chandrayaan-3 success in 2023 highlighted the emergence of new space powers. Japan (JAXA) is collaborating with NASA and pursuing its own lunar missions. The European Space Agency (ESA) contributes to Artemis, while private firms such as SpaceX and Blue Origin provide critical launch and lander systems. Thus, the lunar landscape is multipolar, even if dominated by U.S.–China rivalry.
Legal and Normative Framework
The legal foundation of space exploration rests on the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which prohibits sovereignty claims and mandates peaceful use. However, the treaty is silent on resource extraction. The United States has advanced the Artemis Accords, which allow for resource utilization consistent with the OST, but China and Russia reject these accords, arguing that they reflect unilateral rule-making.
This divergence signals a potential fragmentation of space governance. If U.S. partners operate under Artemis principles while China and its allies pursue the ILRS, two competing normative regimes could emerge. Such bifurcation could complicate cooperation, create disputes over resource rights, and heighten geopolitical tensions.
Economic and Technological Dimensions
The economic stakes are substantial. Analysts project the global space economy could reach $1 trillion by 2040, with lunar activities—such as mining, construction, and transportation—playing a growing role (Morgan Stanley, 2021). The lunar south pole’s water ice could support fuel production, life support, and industrial processes. Helium-3 and rare earth minerals are also cited as potential resources, though their extraction remains technologically challenging.
Technologically, the Moon serves as a testbed for deep-space capabilities. U.S. reliance on private-sector innovation (e.g., SpaceX’s Starship for Artemis landings) represents a hybrid model, while China’s centralized model ensures state control but may lack the agility of commercial ecosystems. Both approaches carry risks: U.S. dependence on contractors could face delays or failures, while China’s state-driven system may encounter bottlenecks in innovation.
Ethical and Social Considerations
Beyond economics and strategy, lunar exploration raises ethical questions. Should humanity prioritize sustainable practices to avoid contaminating the lunar environment? How should benefits from lunar resources be distributed globally, given that space is defined as the “province of all mankind”? (United Nations, 1967). Moreover, the symbolism of renewed lunar landings could reinforce narratives of technological inequality, with only a few states reaping benefits while others remain spectators.
Public engagement is another dimension. Apollo inspired generations with a sense of collective achievement. Artemis and China’s programs face the challenge of rekindling that inspiration while addressing contemporary concerns about climate change, inequality, and global priorities.
Future Scenarios
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Optimistic (Cooperative Future)
In this scenario, both the U.S. and China achieve successful lunar landings and establish complementary bases. Scientific data is shared, governance frameworks are harmonized, and the Moon becomes a platform for collaborative exploration of Mars. This scenario maximizes scientific and societal benefits but requires significant political will. -
Competitive (Bifurcated Order)
Here, U.S. and Chinese blocs establish rival bases under competing legal regimes. Cooperation is minimal, disputes over resources intensify, and the Moon becomes a site of strategic competition. This reflects a realist outlook, with space as an extension of great-power rivalry. -
Intermediate (Managed Competition)
Both powers achieve key milestones but maintain limited channels of scientific exchange. Competition dominates, but minimal agreements prevent escalation. This scenario is plausible, balancing rivalry with recognition of mutual interests in avoiding conflict.
Discussion and Recommendations
The comparative analysis suggests that the United States has a higher probability of achieving its immediate goals—Artemis II and III—within the next decade, while China’s 2030 crewed landing is ambitious but feasible. However, China’s long-term strategy of building a permanent ILRS may provide it with strategic depth, particularly if the U.S. struggles with political and budgetary discontinuities.
To avoid destabilizing rivalry, several recommendations emerge:
- Strengthen Multilateral Governance: Expand international dialogue under the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) to develop inclusive frameworks for resource utilization.
- Encourage Transparency: Both the U.S. and China should publish mission plans and scientific results to build trust.
- Promote Joint Scientific Projects: Even amid rivalry, limited cooperation—such as data sharing or complementary experiments—can foster mutual benefits.
- Integrate Ethical Guidelines: Establish norms for environmental stewardship and equitable benefit-sharing to prevent exploitative practices.
- Leverage Middle Powers: Countries such as India, Japan, and members of ESA can act as mediators, pushing for balanced governance.
Russia’s Role in the Emerging Lunar Order
Although contemporary analyses of lunar exploration largely emphasize the rivalry between the United States and China, Russia remains a relevant—if diminished—actor in the unfolding competition. Historically, the Soviet Union pioneered space achievements, including the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957 and Yuri Gagarin’s orbital flight in 1961, cementing its legacy in the annals of space exploration (Harford, 2020). Yet, Russia’s modern lunar program has faced technological and financial stagnation, limiting its independent capacity to project influence.
A recent illustration of these challenges was the failure of Luna 25 in August 2023, Russia’s first attempt at a lunar landing in nearly half a century. The spacecraft crashed during descent, highlighting the technological difficulties Moscow faces after years of underinvestment and international isolation (Wall, 2023). Despite these setbacks, Russia has pursued strategic alignment with China, co-developing the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), a long-term project envisioned as a multiphase infrastructure on the lunar surface (Wu & Li, 2021). By partnering with China, Russia seeks to remain relevant in shaping lunar governance while countering the U.S.-led Artemis Accords.
Geopolitically, Russia’s role is constrained by sanctions and the erosion of international collaboration with Western partners. Its participation in the International Space Station (ISS) remains a vestige of the Cold War détente, but its gradual pivot toward Beijing signals a future in which Russia functions as a secondary but symbolically important partner in a Sino-Russian lunar bloc. This partnership could amplify China’s legitimacy by invoking Russia’s historical prestige in spaceflight, while also reinforcing a bifurcation of governance models between Western-aligned and Sino-Russian visions of lunar activity.
Looking ahead, Russia’s influence will likely depend on the sustainability of its cooperation with China and its capacity to overcome technological deficiencies. In optimistic scenarios, Moscow could provide complementary expertise in rocketry and orbital mechanics, bolstering the ILRS initiative. In more pessimistic outlooks, however, Russia risks being relegated to a junior partner role, with limited agency in shaping the broader lunar order. Either outcome suggests that while Russia is no longer the central protagonist of lunar exploration, it remains a crucial variable in the multipolar dynamics of 21st-century space competition.
Conclusion
The new lunar race between the United States and China represents both an extraordinary scientific opportunity and a profound geopolitical challenge. The U.S. holds advantages in technology, alliances, and commercial dynamism, while China advances through a systematic, state-driven strategy with ambitious long-term goals. The probabilities of success for both are high, though timelines may shift. The broader consequences will extend far beyond the Moon, influencing the governance of space, the balance of global power, and the trajectory of human expansion into the solar system.
Ultimately, the future of lunar exploration will depend not only on rockets and landers but on the choices states make regarding cooperation, competition, and responsibility. If managed wisely, the Moon can serve as a bridge for humanity’s collective advancement. If mismanaged, it risks becoming another arena of rivalry, with consequences that extend into the twenty-first century and beyond.
References
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